I. INTRODUCTION
About one hundred years ago, Seligman (1908) observed that "the tendency toward progressive taxation is almost everywhere on the increase". However, income tax progressivity at the beginning of the 20 th century was rather moderate by contemporary standards. The top personal income tax (PIT) rate in 15 surveyed countries hardly exceeded 10%. "The highest point known to history as actually enforced is thirty-seven and a half percent", which lasted only a year in Holland in 1796. Referring to this case, Seligman remarks "the progression was so severe as to become a confiscation".
By 1981, the 37.5% top PIT rate was no longer the highest historical point -4 of every 5 country had the top PIT rate exceeding 37.5%, with the maximum of 90% in Iran. The GDPweighted average top statutory marginal PIT rate was 62% among 108 countries. National PIT systems were frequently plagued by multiple tax schedules, complicated tax formulas, surcharges, numerous exemptions, and escalating highly-partitioned tax scales.
However, many governments made significant changes to their national PIT systems, since 1981. The GDP-weighted average top statutory marginal PIT rate fell from 62% in 1981 to 42.9% in 1991 and by 2005 reached a twenty five year low of 36.4%. There was also a sizeable drop in marginal and average PIT rates at higher levels of individual income and an overall decline in structural progressivity of the PIT systems. We observe a growing trend toward the use of one-rate flat personal income taxation 1 and find some evidence of increased simplicity of several characteristics of the PIT structure. It is apparent that the current tax rates are lower while tax structures are flatter and, to a certain degree, simpler than they were 25 years ago.
This study adds to the taxation literature by providing a careful methodological documentation of the changes that have taken place in personal income taxation over the last 25
years. The analysis we provide is important for a number of reasons. First, the coverage of the analysis is unprecedented as we describe the changes that have taken place in almost 190 countries worldwide. Relying on such a large panel of countries means that the trends we describe are not likely to suffer from a sample selection bias. More importantly, we are able to document the variation in the personal income tax (PIT) evolution across countries at different stages of economic development.
Second, we calculate and analyze the time varying marginal and average tax rates at different points of the income scale. These tax measures represent a significant improvement over the commonly used top statutory PIT rate. The existence of deductions, allowances, tax credits, surtaxes, and local taxes means that there is often a big difference between the effective and statutory tax rates. This, along with excessive income inequality, implies that the top rate does not apply to most individuals in many countries. We address this issue by using more common levels of earned income in calculating tax rates and by making adjustments for deductions, allowances, tax credits, and other legal rules. As such, our tax rate measures are much closer to the actual rates that individuals are supposed to pay.
Third, the unique information we collected allows us to identify the long-term trends in such important features of national PIT systems as progressivity and complexity. Our progressivity measure is the progression slope of either average or marginal rates along the income scale, which is calculated for each country and year using 100 data points that are formed around the country's GDP per capita. This measure has been trending downward in every country category, with the exception of low income countries. We also summarize the trends in several observable dimensions of the PIT complexity, including the complexity of allowances and tax credits, the use of multiple tax schedules, non-standard tax formulas, local taxes, national surtaxes, and the number of PIT brackets.
Fourth, the existing measures of PIT rates are generally available for a cross section of countries at a point in time or very short panels with limited time variation. Furthermore, the existing data sources usually under represent developing countries. The coverage and comparability of our tax measures go a long way in filling this gap. Because we rely on data from several sources, we are able to provide a greater level of consistency, both across countries as well as within country over time, than data from any one source. Having a long panel is also useful in identifying within-country dynamics of tax measures while controlling for constant cross-country heterogeneity.
Finally, we examine the relationship between the tax rates and collected revenue for a large subset of countries. The question we are interested in is whether the reduced rates and progressivity had a considerable negative effect on PIT collection. We find that the relationship between the tax rates and revenue is positive for high income countries; however, the strength of the relationship declines with weaker institutions and lower levels of economic development.
The PIT rates do not seem to matter for revenue collection in countries with high levels of government corruption.
Admittedly, we ignore other components of the tax system such as taxes on corporate income, domestic consumption, and international trade. Accounting for changes in these other taxes is important when looking at the impact of the global reform on economic outcomes.
However, collecting and analyzing information on these additional components, while useful, would prove too monumental a task for one paper. We leave the analysis of other components to future research.
We begin by providing a quick overview of the data followed by an analysis of major global trends in personal income taxation, in particular, the high frequency of PIT changes, a ubiquitous decline in top statutory PIT rates, a downward movement in actual marginal and average rates at higher levels of individual income, decreasing structural PIT progressivity, and increasing simplicity of national tax systems. This is followed by an analysis of the effect these changes may have had on PIT collection.
II. DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE
The data analyzed in the paper covers personal income tax structures in 189 current and former countries worldwide for the period 1981 to 2005. As far as we know, this is the first panel study of this size that analyzes the historical changes that have occurred in personal income tax structures over the last 25 years.
Our dataset is comprehensive and contains the complete national PIT schedules with statutory rates, tax brackets, country-specific tax formulas, basic allowances, standard deductions, tax credits, multiple tax scales, national surcharges, and local taxes. This information allows us to compute several important variables including statutory rates, number of tax brackets, actual average and marginal tax rates at different points of income distribution, frequency of tax changes, and various measures of PIT progressivity and complexity.
This consolidated PIT dataset was assembled from more than 100 distinct reference books and datasets. Of these, the most important sources are the tax anthologies published by international accounting firms (e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, Coopers and Lybrand, etc.) The following examples can give a sense of inconsistencies we dealt with. The Russian top PIT rate is coded as 90% in the 1990 WTD while this rate was applied only to the inheritors of book writers for honorariums received. We had to change this rate to the second highest rate of 60% charged on incomes from individual economic activity that was often performed underground. The top marginal PIT rate for Denmark rises from 22% to 68% in the 1988 WTD while in fact it drops from 73% to 68%. The reason for such a discrepancy is omitted surcharges and regional taxes prior to 1988 in WTD. Significant inconsistencies may affect the overall trends as well as bias the estimates in the behavioral models based on these data. 3 This dataset is planned to be publicly released as part of the World Tax Indicators v.1 in 2009. 4 Some of the largest samples in earlier studies include 51 marginal PIT rates from developing countries in 1984 -1985 (Sicat and Vermani, 1988 and 66 top PIT rates in 1980 -1989 (Lee and Gordon, 2005 our tax data are located in all populated geographic regions and continents, 5 and they represent approximately 94% of the world population and 98.5% of the world output (or more precisely, 86% of the world GDP in current U. S. dollars in 1981, 89% in 1982, 97% in 1983-1988 , and 98-99% in all subsequent years).
6
Year to year changes in the number of countries are unavoidable in long panels like ours.
These changes are mostly due to 1) the lack of data in early years for some countries, and 2) the formation of new countries and the dismantling of old ones. The former mainly affects developing countries while the latter applies primarily to transitional countries that emerged following the breakup of communist states in the early 1990's. 7 The number of countries per year in our sample starts at 108 in 1981 and steadily increases up to a max of 180 in 2004, with the total number of covered countries being 189. Even at 108 countries, our initial sample is highly representative. In the web data appendix, we show that the distribution of countries by income level in our tax sample matches fairly well the distribution of countries in the general population during the early years of the sample period and subsequent years. In the next section, we provide more formal testing for the effect of the changing sample composition on our results. 5 The regional breakdown is as follows: Africa -48 countries, The major economies with missing PIT rates in the early 1980s are former USSR in 1981 -1982 and Italy in 1981 We gathered tax information on countries before and after they breakup to form new countries. For example, our dataset includes information for the USSR from 1983 up to its breakup in 1991. Data is then collected for all 15 new countries formed after the breakup for the remainder of our sample. Other countries that went through breakups are treated similarly, e.g., Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia (with Eritrea included).
III. TRENDS IN PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATES

A. Continuous Tax Reform
An examination of the dataset reveals a number of remarkable changes in personal income taxation over the last twenty five years. The first important observation is that tax rates, income thresholds, and the overall tax structures are continuously changing. The last column of
Panel A in Table 1 shows that, on average, 45% of the countries in our sample change at least one element of their national tax schedule (statutory rates or tax brackets) every year. Of these countries, about half make full changes by altering both rates and bracket thresholds simultaneously (more so in the late 1980s). The slow adjustment of tax brackets to inflation in low income countries is likely to be related to widespread evasion, weak enforcement, and little revenue collected from personal income tax.
The high frequency of changes may also be due to the gradual enactment of tax reforms that get implemented over several years, fiscal policy response to the business cycle, or continuous experimentation and search for the best tax structure. Whatever the motivation behind the high frequency changes, one might expect some negative feedback for efficiency.
This follows from the fact that a constantly changing tax schedule adds uncertainty to the tax system which is likely to increase complexity and reduce efficiency. 10 The important question for us is whether these changes are simply transitory in nature or is there some well defined direction of change. If changes are being made on the grounds of efficiency, then one may expect persistent trends to develop over time as countries try to improve the efficiency of their tax structures by reducing rates. The remainder of this section gives a detailed analysis of the resulting trends that have developed over time.
B. Top Statutory PIT Rates
One of the frequently cited variables of any income tax system is the top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rate. This is a legally determined marginal tax rate applicable to the top bracket of the income tax schedule. This particular tax rate has occasionally been used in empirical cross-country research as a proxy variable for tax progressivity or as a way of assessing the overall excess tax burden (e.g., Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998, Friedman et al., 2000 , among others).
Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates how the average top statutory tax rate has dropped considerably over the last twenty five years. This decline was especially pronounced for the 10 Constantly changing features of the tax schedule cause individuals to be uncertain about their tax liability and thus increase compliance and administrative costs (Slemrod 1992 Further evidence in support of the worldwide downward trend is reported in Table 2 where we observe that only 17% of unweighted top PIT rates were in excess of 40% We also report the trend in GDP-weighted top PIT rate by country income group in Table   3 and Panel B of Figure 1 . These summary statistics show clearly that each country category experienced a significant decline in the GDP-weighted top PIT rate. (Whalley, 1990) . According to Bird and Zolt (2005) and Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) , slowing economic growth, inflation, the increased pace of globalization, economic liberalization, growing international trade, the rise of supply side economics, and a general shift towards smaller governments paved the way for much of the earlier spells of tax reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s. Given that these conditions were mostly ubiquitous, it is difficult to separate the role of competition from these common motivational factors (Whalley, 1990) . Nonetheless, there is some evidence that tax mimicking took place in corporate tax reforms (Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008) and to a lesser degree in PIT reforms (Sabirianova Peter, 2008 ).
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C. Actual Marginal and Average PIT Rates
The top statutory PIT rate is generally quoted in impressionistic comparisons of national income tax schedules, and, in particular, as a proxy for the tax burden in some empirical research. In a sense, it is easy to see why this rate is so widely used, as it is potentially the maximum marginal tax rate facing the wealthiest taxpayers. However, the top statutory rate in less developed economies is often irrelevant to the majority of domestic high earners and entrepreneurs, with the exception of a small number of expatriates and the wealthiest local business owners (Sicat and Virmani, 1988, Tanzi and Zee, 2000) . For example, in high income countries the top statutory PIT rate is applicable, on average, to the level of income equivalent to the triple of a country's GDP per capita. In contrast, the ratio of the top threshold to a country's GDP per capita is about 18 in upper middle income countries, 47 in lower middle income countries, and 83 in low income countries. 14 It is therefore important to examine the trends in PIT rates at other points of the income distribution that are more relevant to the majority of population. The problem though, is that it is practically unfeasible to find the actual income distribution for the large number of countries over the 25-year period. As an alternative, we use a country's GDP per capita and its multiples as a comparable income base.
13 Sabirianova Peter (2009) establishes that a country's PIT rate is positively correlated with the distance weighted PIT rates of its neighbors after controlling for observable characteristics and country fixed effects. 14 It is important to note that only conditional on the income distribution, the share of people affected by the top rate will be inversely related to the ratio of top threshold to mean income. We find that this ratio decreases with country's GDP per capita after controlling for the level of income inequality as measured by the GINI coefficient.
Results are not reported in this paper but are available upon request. We should also note that the government may exercise significant control over the share of its population that is subject to the PIT, as illustrated for China and India in Piketty and Qian (2009) .
In addition to having rates at different levels of individual earnings, our data also allow us to calculate the actual marginal tax rates that are generally more preferred to the statutory rates dictated by national tax schedules. It is not unusual for these two rates to differ significantly. A local tax, national surtax, or additional tax schedules can raise the actual marginal tax rate above the officially stated rate. Personal deductions and tax credits, on the other hand, can lower the actual marginal tax rate below the legal rate. To estimate actual marginal tax rates for each country in our sample, we first calculate taxable income for 4 different levels of pre-tax income equivalent to 1, 2, 3, and 4 times a country's GDP per capita. 15 Taxable income excludes standard deductions, basic personal allowances, and employee/wage allowances, which are unconditionally applicable to all single, employed taxpayers. 16 Next, we apply the tax schedule and, whenever relevant, particular tax formulas to the taxable income in order to compute the tax liability for each income level. 17 The tax liability also includes local taxes and major national surtaxes if altogether they exceed 5% of the taxable income. 18 The final tax liability figure is adjusted by subtracting the tax credits that are universally applicable to single taxpayers. Finally, the actual marginal rates are calculated as Δ tax liability / Δ income for each of the 4 values of gross income.
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Using tax liability figures, we also compute the average tax rate as the ratio of total tax liability to gross income for each level of income. It is important to emphasize that the average rate is the tax rate that the individual taxpayers face or are supposed to pay under current tax laws, not the rate they choose to pay by means of underreporting their income. As such, the average tax rate gives an upper bound on the effective rate paid by individuals under the PIT. Figure 2 shows that in any given year the marginal rates are higher than their respective average rates, and that both average and marginal rates increase with the level of income. These are the two main indications that the personal income tax structure for most of the countries remains progressive. More important for the current discussion, however, is the clear downward trend over the sample period irrespective of the rate chosen. Again, the greatest downturn in the tax rates took place during the mid to late eighties, with a consistent but moderate decline in the subsequent years.
Also important to note is that there is some amount of convergence between the actual rates for higher and lower income levels: high-income rates fell at a much faster rate than lowincome rates. This is evident in Table 4 , which reports the estimated slopes from regressing marginal and average PIT rates on a trend variable by country category at four income levels.
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For example, marginal tax rates (MTR) at y, where y denotes GDP per capita, fell by -0.49
19 For the level of gross income equivalent to a country's GDP per capita, actual and statutory marginal rates are approximately the same in 66% cases (within one percentage point deviation), the statutory rate is greater in 29% cases, and it is less in 5% cases. The similarities between actual and statutory rates tend to increase with the level of gross income. 20 The estimates in Panel A are weighted by GDP in constant 1990 U.S. dollars while those in Panel B are unweighted but include country fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-robust standard errors.
percentage points per year whereas MTR at 4⋅y went down by -0.76 percentage points per year;
the difference in the rates of decline is statistically significant at all conventional levels of significance. A similar convergence result is obtained with respect to the annual decline in average rates (-0.32 percentage point decline at y vs. -0.57 at 4⋅y). This apparent convergence could be an indication that the tax reforms have reduced the progressivity of income tax structures that we examine further below.
Thus, if we take a worldwide weighted average, we observe a tendency of national tax systems toward lower actual marginal and average PIT rates at different points of the generated income scale, and this tendency seems particularly strong at the higher levels of individual earnings. The unweighted trend is also negative and statistically significant even after controlling for country time-invariant heterogeneity and serial correlation (Table 4 , Panel B).
While it is true on average, this conclusion does not hold for the poorest countries. We find that high and upper middle income countries have declining actual PIT rates over the 25-year period while the least developed countries had either no change or an increase in rates throughout the sample period. 21 These results are not that surprising in light of the evidence presented in the previous section on the frequency with which the PIT structure changes. Since the low income countries make very few changes to their bracket thresholds and experience much higher inflation than the other groups of countries, it is predictable that the actual rates are increasing over time, especially for the upper middle class. 22 Households with below median income are 21 In concordance with an earlier observation, the decline in both marginal and average rates for the high and upper middle income countries was stronger for higher levels of individual earnings. 22 We found a positive correlation between the number of years since last change in brackets and the change in upper average and marginal tax rates (ATR and MTR at 3.y and 4.y), and that this correlation increases with the inflation rate. This finding supports the "bracket creep" explanation of increasing average and marginal rates in an inflationary environment.
often not liable (and not able) to pay any taxes because their income is generally lower than the first tax threshold. Therefore, entrepreneurs and high skilled workers are most likely to be victims of the increase in average and marginal rates in the poor countries.
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An important question to ask at this stage is whether the changing sample composition played any role in the observed trends. We test for any such effects by estimating the trend coefficient on tax variables using only the initial set of countries and comparing the results with those obtained using the full sample. The results confirm that there is no compositional effect.
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Thus, we can be confident that the results we document are not influenced in any significant way by changes in the number of countries over time.
IV. STRUCTURAL PROGRESSIVITY
The evidence so far shows that there has been a significant shift towards lower tax burden, especially at the top of the income distribution. These changes can justifiably be assumed to have a negative effect on the structural progressivity of the income tax system. The term structural progressivity is introduced by Musgrave and Thin (1948) to denote changes in the calculated (nominal) tax burden along the income distribution, as opposed to the effective progressivity that depicts changes in actual income inequality.
In this study, we focus on the structural progressivity of personal income taxes. We believe that the measures of structural progressivity are particularly useful in determining the effect of legal changes in PIT schedules on growth, evasion, income inequality, and other important outcomes. Unlike structural progressivity, effective progressivity is directly derived from collected revenues and existing income distribution, which makes the identification of the causal effect of the effective progressivity on the outcomes from which it is derived highly problematic. Additionally, the data requirements of our approach are far less demanding than some of the existing approaches that calculate effective tax rates (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993, Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar, 1994) .
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To assess the structural PIT progressivity for each country in the sample, we calculate the marginal rate progression (MRP) and average rate progression (ARP). Unlike Musgrave and Thin (1948) , whose progressivity measures vary over the income distribution, we develop a single, comprehensive measure for each country using the following procedure. First, we compute marginal and average rates for each country and each year at 100 different levels of pretax income that are evenly spread in the range from 4% to 400% of a country's GDP per capita (the calculation process is similar to the one described in Section III). These variables are then used to construct marginal and average rate progression indices (MRP1 and ARP1, respectively) by regressing marginal (or average) rates on the log of gross income. 26 For example, ARP1 for 25 Full implementation of Easterly and Rebelo's (1993) method requires data on income distribution, statutory tax rates, and actual tax revenues collected. Assumptions about the tax function, the income distribution, and the level at which taxes are paid are also required (e.g., taxes are assumed to be paid at the household level and that each household has 5 members). Only 32 countries were included in their analysis due to data requirements. Although Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) rely on fewer parametric assumptions, their approach also requires data that are not readily available for many countries. Detailed data on national accounts (e.g., wages, consumption, operating surplus of the economy, etc.) and tax revenues (for different sources and at different levels of government) are needed to calculate their effective tax rates. Even if these data were available, comparability across countries would still remain an issue. In fact, the authors initially calculated their tax measure for G7 countries only and later included 11 additional OECD member countries. 26 It is important to emphasize that we do not make any assumptions on how income is distributed within the chosen boundaries. Such assumptions would be critical if we were interested in the effective measures of tax progressivity. Instead, we focus on structural measures that depend only on the tax law (including rates, deductions, exemptions, credits, etc.) and the end points of our income range. For comparability purposes, we use the same income Canada in 2005 is the estimated slope coefficient from the regression of average tax rates in 2005 on the log of gross income using 100 data points that are formed around Canada's GDP per capita. The tax structure is interpreted as progressive, proportional or regressive if the slope is positive, zero, or negative, respectively. Thus, in order to get a single, comprehensive measure, we had to assume that the relationship between rates and income levels is linear. In an effort to capture some nonlinearity of these measures, we also calculate MRP2 and ARP2 for the middle portion of income distribution in the range from 100% to 300% of a country's GDP per capita.
Panel A of Table 5 provides the GDP-weighted means of the progressivity measures over the sample period. We observe that both progressivity measures are positive for the full sample period indicating that the tax structures remain progressive despite many reforms. It is also
shown that structural progressivity declined over the sample period. We note, for example, that Table 5 , we observe a noticeable decline in all progressivity measures throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is consistent with our earlier discussion, which highlighted these years as periods of significant tax reforms. Panel C shows that after accounting for country fixed effects and serial correlation, the average within-country trend for progressivity measures stays negative and for the most part statistically significant, with the exception of MRP2 that has large standard errors.
We also note that the structural progressivity of the income tax system is smaller in the middle of the income distribution (MRP2 and ARP2) than for the broader distribution (MRP1 and ARP1), thus confirming the non-linearity of the progressivity measures.
boundaries around country's GDP per capita, which are large enough to represent most of the actual income distribution.
Along with the average worldwide trend toward lower structural progressivity, we also observe significant variation in the progressivity dynamics across country type. Panel B in Table   5 shows that countries that experienced the strongest decline in the progressivity measures belong to the high income and upper middle income categories. The downward trend slope is much smaller in lower middle income countries, and the trend is positive and statistically significant in the poorest developing economies. This result is not surprising given our earlier finding of an increase in actual tax rates at the top of the distribution in low income countries.
The outmost case of zero (or near to zero) structural progressivity deserves special consideration. It occurs when a country has either no tax 27 or a one-rate flat tax that is not 
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The increasing popularity of the flat PIT rate among former communist countries could be an outcome of regional tax competition, but may also reflect common historical institutional background. For example, most centrally-planned economies were characterized by dysfunctional tax administrations and populations with little experience in paying taxes. 27 The number of countries with zero tax was relatively stable throughout the sample period, between 15 and 17 countries. These countries include some of the oil countries (e.g., Brunei Darussalam, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, etc.) and famous offshore islands and tax havens (e.g., Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, etc.). 28 It should be noted that the flat PIT rate is not a pure flat consumption tax as outlined in Hall and Rabushka (1985) . Different rates may still apply to capital gains and business income. The presence of deductions in some countries means that the 'flat' PIT rate may not be proportional. As of 2009, the list of countries adopted the flat PIT rate includes Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Iraq, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Serbia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ukraine.
Consequently, there were strong incentives for tax evasion, especially among the rich, resulting in falling revenues, significant tax arrears, and a thriving underground economy. The flat rate is seen as a means of combating these problems. 29 Given the small size of the middle class in many of these countries, the governments were less concerned about the distributional effects of the flat PIT schedule. In addition, the flat tax may also have served as a signal to the international community that these countries are committed to market oriented reforms.
Overall, the data analysis points to PIT schedules flattening out over time. 30 Whether these changes translated into lower or higher effective progressivity (and associated income inequality) remains an open question. The relationship between structural progressivity and effective progressivity is quite complex. In theory, it is possible for structural and effective progressivity to move in opposite directions following changes in tax rates. Musgrave and Thin (1948) showed that a shift to a higher revenue-yielding tax structure that maintains the same level of average rate progression at all points of the income distribution will cause effective progression to increase. Furthermore, if the tax reform increases productivity and reduces tax evasion, then a reduction in structural progressivity may actually result in higher effective progressivity, and hence greater equity, assuming that the redistribution of the increased tax revenues is progressive or pro-poor. But even when redistribution from rich to poor does not occur, lower taxes on the rich could in principle decrease true net income inequality if the share of hidden income among the rich is large while the elasticity of true income/productivity is small relative to the elasticity of hidden income with respect to tax changes (Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2008) .
Importantly, the equity implications of the fall in PIT progressivity may be reinforced or offset by changes in other aspects of the tax system. For example, developing countries have increased their reliance on consumption taxes while reducing their dependence on tariffs over the period of our study (Bahl and Bird, 2008) . Because consumption taxes are known to be regressive, the net effect of these changes on effective progressivity is likely to be ambiguous for low income countries; recall that PIT progressivity increased for the poorest developing countries. A scientific assessment of how reduced PIT structural progressivity may have affected overall effective progressivity requires detailed micro-level analysis, which is difficult to implement on a large cross-country basis due to significant data requirements.
V. TREND TOWARD SIMPLICITY
In this section, we show that in addition to the downward trend in statutory and actual PIT rates, there has also been a consistent drive toward PIT simplicity. Having a complex tax structure is costly as it is likely to encourage tax evasion and unofficial economy transactions.
There are also direct social costs imposed on the society by having a complex tax system, including the costs of filing the returns (both time and monetary), efforts to calculate deductions and allowances as well as other efforts to reduce taxable income. Slemrod and Sorum (1984) show that these direct costs were very high for the U.S. PIT system in 1982 consuming approximately 5−7% of tax revenues generated in that year. There is also a tradeoff between simplicity and other characteristics of the tax structure. This is true especially where efforts to distinguish among taxpayers in achieving a more equitable distribution increases the complexity of the tax structure (Slemrod, 1992) . Therefore, the trend in complexity is important since it has implications for both equity and efficiency.
Measuring the extent of complexity in a tax system is extremely difficult, especially in the cross-country setting. We recognize that our cross-country analysis cannot account for many important dimensions of tax complexity such as clarity of tax laws and regulations, costs of tax planning and paperwork, time needed to submit declarations, number of exemptions and itemized deductions, and other analogous factors, which are hard to measure even for one country, much less for many countries. It is virtually impossible to collect time-varying data on these factors for our sample; 189 countries for 25 years. Despite these limitations, our discussion does provide useful and comparable cross-country information on several key dimensions of PIT complexity that we are able to quantify for a large number of countries.
Among those dimensions are the complexity of allowances and tax credits, multiple tax schedules, non-standard tax formulas, local taxes, national surtaxes, and the number of PIT brackets. Having no allowances, for example, is considered to be less complex than having allowances, while having allowances that depend on the spouse's employment participation is considered more complex than having a standard allowance. 31 Similarly, having a single PIT schedule is simpler than having multiple schedules since a single tax schedule eliminates any confusion as to which schedule individuals should use when filing their tax returns. 32 Nonstandard formulas for tax computations also add to the tax complexity as they often require extra rules, regulations and definitions to make these formulas work (footnote 17 gives an example of 31 Personal allowances and tax credits are considered standard if they are applicable to the taxpayer, spouse, and/or children without any restricting conditions (such as age, children being at school, spouse not working, etc.). 32 Multiple tax schedules include, but not limited to, alternative minimum tax as well as schedules that depend on occupation, industry, location, marital status, and other characteristics of a resident taxpayer.
non-standard tax formulas). National surtaxes and separate local/provincial PIT rates are other obvious factors contributing to complexity. Finally, the excessive partitioning of personal income into multiple tax brackets is often associated with larger administrative and information costs and may create additional incentives for manipulating taxable income to move down the graduated scale.
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From Table 6 we observe that the share of countries with non-standard allowances or tax credits fell from 53% in the first five year period of the sample to 40% in the last five year period. There is also a noticeable decline in the use of surtaxes and high local tax rates (defined as 5% of taxable income or greater) and a corresponding increase in the use of low local tax rates. Likewise, the percentage of countries using non-standard tax formulas fell by 10 percentage points or over 50% between 1981 and 2005. Unlike the other components, the use of multiple schedules increased slightly between the first and second period before also showing a steady decline from 22% in the second period to 17% in the last. Table 6 also indicate significant cross-country variation in the characteristics of the PIT systems. From the probit estimates in Panel B, we see that high income countries are more likely to have non-standard allowances and tax credits, high local taxes, and non-standard tax formulas. Low income countries, on the other hand, have a higher likelihood of using multiple tax schedules, imposing low local taxes, and using standard allowances and tax credits.
Results in
The downward trend depicted by the probit estimation is consistent with the above discussion of the mean values by period. Panel C of Table 6 reports the estimated trend coefficient from the linear probability model that controls for country fixed effects and accounts for arbitrary serial 33 The large number of brackets makes it difficult for taxpayers to know their marginal tax rate and hence to make more informed decisions (Slemrod, 1992) . It also increases the incentives of taxpayers to play around the multiple thresholds in attempt to move down the graduated scale.
correlation. While the overall trend remains negative, it becomes statistically insignificant for three indicators (surtaxes, high local taxes, and multiple tax schedules) that could be due to limited within-country variation in these measures.
In our dataset, approximately 50% of countries had more than 10 tax brackets in the 1981-1985 period with approximately 9% having more than 20 brackets, up to 68 in Guatemala.
This is in comparison to 5.5% and 0.4% in the 2001-2005 period, respectively. The GDPweighted trends in Figure 3 indicate that the average number of tax brackets declined worldwide and has remained in the 4-6 bracket range since 1995 for all country groups.
Thus, we find that the observed indicators of PIT complexity have exhibited downward trends over the last quarter century. The steep drop in the average number of tax brackets, the gradual elimination of surtaxes, and the dwindling use of multiple tax schedules, non-standard allowances and tax formulas has moved countries toward simpler PIT structures.
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VI. PIT RATES AND PIT REVENUE
Having examined the major trends in personal income tax rate structure, the natural follow-up question is whether and how these changes influenced collected PIT revenue. Since tax revenue is the product of the tax rate and tax base, determining what happened to collected revenues implicitly tells us what happened to the tax base. Our objective in this section is to establish the trend in PIT revenue over the sample period and to examine the relationship between PIT revenue and our tax measures. 34 Transition to simpler income tax systems does not necessarily imply a drop in the cost of compliance and tax administration. These costs may increase even if there is a reduction in complexity (Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1992, Tran-Nam, Evans, and Walpole, 2000) . A more rigorous analysis of these trends is provided in Table 7 where we report the trend coefficients for PIT revenue to GDP ratio. While the pooled OLS results show a statistically significant decline over the sample period, we find no evidence of a trend in the ratio when we include country fixed effects. Given the overall decline in average PIT rates described above, one implication of these results is that the PIT tax base increased over time. However, there appears to be some differences across country groups for PIT revenue. In particular, we find evidence of a statistically significant within-country decline in the PIT/GDP ratio for high income countries (the coefficient on Trend in column 3). Lower middle and low income countries, on the other hand, have a modest upward trend after controlling for country fixed effects. These results are very interesting in light of the changes in PIT rates described in Section 3. In fact, the trends seem to imply that the lower PIT rates are associated with lower PIT revenue in high income countries and with higher PIT revenue in low income countries.
We explore this finding further by regressing the PIT/GDP ratio on selected tax variables, including the top rate, average and marginal rates, and PIT progressivity measures. Panel A of Table 8 shows that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between our marginal tax rate variables and the PIT/GDP ratio, after controlling for time and country effects only; similar results are found for the average tax rate measures. Since the positive revenue-tax relationship could be driven by the response of fiscal policy to the business cycle, the strategy of reducing budget deficit, and/or the implementation of large government programs, we include additional controls for short-term macroeconomic fluctuations, lagged budget deficit, and the size of the government into equation (1). In addition, we control for the level of economic development and for the difference between personal and corporate income tax rates to allow for possible income shifting between individual and business accounts.
(1)
where r it is the PIT/GDP ratio in country i and year t; τ it is a tax variable of interest (either PIT rate or progressivity slope); X it-1 is a vector of one-year lagged covariates that include the log of GDP per capita, 37 a 3-year moving average inflation rate, a 3-year moving average growth rate, a budget deficit indicator, and government expenditures as percent of GDP; Z it is a vector of contemporaneous controls such as the difference between personal and corporate income tax rates, an indicator for cash vs. accrual base of the revenue measure, and a time trend; α it is country fixed effects; and ε it is the iid error term.
Since PIT collection may influence which tax rates countries choose, the endogeneity of tax rates does not allow us to make any causal interpretations, even after controlling for additional factors. Still, the estimates of within-country conditional correlation between tax variables and PIT collection are quite informative. The estimates of β reported in panel B of Table 8 suggest that the revenue-tax relationship remains positive and statistically significant for all our tax measures, conditional on many important covariates (vectors X it-1 s and Z it ) and country fixed effects.
More interesting are the results in Panel C where we modify equation (1) by interacting the tax measures with country category to see how the relationship varies with the level of economic development. The estimates imply that the PIT revenue share and tax rates move in the same direction in developed countries. However, the interaction terms of tax variables with other country categories are all negative though not always statistically significant when standard errors are clustered by country. For poor countries, we find that the interaction effect cancels out most of the main effect of the top PIT rate, marginal tax rate at income equivalent to four times GDP per capita, and both progressivity measures (MRP1 and ARP1). That is, the PIT revenue share is not found to be positively associated with higher marginal rates and progressivity 37 To address the concern about possible division bias when using GDP per capita on the right hand side, we have also experimented with other measures of economic development such as life expectancy and the share of services in GDP. The results do not change in any significant way.
measures in low income countries. The complete specification of equation (1) with the interaction between the top rate and country categories is provided in Table A4 of the data appendix.
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These results do raise additional questions. The most obvious being why is there such difference in the relationship between PIT rates and PIT revenue across country types? The following decomposition may help to answer to this question. Suppose R/Y is the share of PIT revenue in GDP, where revenue, R, is the product of the PIT base, B, and the average PIT rate, τ.
Then, the response of the PIT/GDP ratio to changes in the tax rate can be written as:
, which we rewrite as
where τ R ∈ , τ B ∈ , and τ Y ∈ are the elasticities of the PIT/GDP ratio, PIT base, and GDP in response to the tax rate, respectively. From equation (3), we observe that the responsiveness of the PIT/GDP ratio is negatively related to the responsiveness of the tax base. Therefore, one possible explanation for the observed weak relationship between the tax rate and PIT revenue in developing countries is that the tax base is relatively more responsive to tax rates in developing 38 Most additional covariates have an expected sign. Predictably, we find that the PIT revenue share is negatively related to higher inflation, slower economic growth, deficit in the government budget, and a smaller size of the government. However, we do not find statistically significant association of the PIT revenue share with GDP per capita (after controlling for the income group) and with the difference between personal and corporate rates. The estimated coefficients on tax measures and interaction terms are not sensitive to omitting all or some of the X and Z variables. We also estimate the model separately for OECD and non-OECD countries and find the estimated β's to be relatively large, positive, and statistically significant in more developed OECD countries and positive, but not different from zero in non-OECD countries. countries than in developed countries. This, in turn, could be due to the presence of weak institutions, which encourage corruption and evasion activities.
Conventional wisdom in the taxation literature is that timing and accounting-form responses of the tax base are generally larger than real responses (Slemrod, 1990) . This is supported by recent evidence that the productivity response to the Russian flat tax reform was small relative to the compliance response (Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sabirianova Peter, 2009) . If the tax base contracts more sizably relative to GDP in reaction to higher tax rates due to a large evasion response, as is probably the case in countries with substantial informal economies, then the absolute difference between the elasticities in equation (3) becomes positive,
, thus reducing the responsiveness of the PIT/GDP ratio to tax rates. Again, we see the link between the large size of the shadow economy and the weak response of the PIT revenue share to tax changes.
While we cannot perform formal testing of this hypothesis, we can check if the responsiveness of the PIT revenue share to tax rates declines with weaker institutions and, in particular, with the level of corruption that is likely to be correlated with the size of the informal sector. The results, reported in Panel D of Table 8 , show that the relationship between the tax rate and PIT/GDP ratio is positive and statistically significant for countries with very low corruption, but the relationship significantly weakens with higher levels of corruption.
39 These 39 The corruption index is taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Such indices are often subjective and change little over time, leading to a higher noise-to-signal ratio in estimations with fixed effects (FE). As a result, the coefficients estimated with FE are likely to be attenuated towards zero due to measurement error. We note, however, that all our interaction terms in the FE model are statistically significant. This implies that the true interaction effect should be larger in absolute terms compared to what we estimate, and that the presence of measurement error in corruption indices should not alter our conclusions.
results imply that the size of the informal sector may have contributed to the observed weak relationship between the PIT revenue and the tax rate in developing countries.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a panel dataset on the PIT structure that is highly comparable across countries and years, and unprecedented in its coverage. The dataset includes measures of structural progressivity as well as average and marginal PIT rates at different points of the income scale. Also included is information on tax brackets, statutory rates, basic allowances, tax credits, etc. These features make our data the desirable source for studies of the relationship between tax policy and economic outcomes in a country level setting.
Using this dataset, we identify and determine the direction of a momentous change in the world's tax systems. We highlight a tax reform process in which governments have moved away from complex, progressive tax systems featuring multiple tax brackets and escalating stair step tax rates to simpler, flatter tax schedules distinguished by fewer tax brackets and lower tax rates.
As the trends continue to play out, we also see a nascent secondary trend emerging where the conventional stair-stepped tax schedule is being replaced by a flat tax rate. The recent acceleration in this trend began with Estonia's adoption of a flat tax in 1994 and has since spread to other post-communist countries. As noted earlier, the number of countries using flat tax rates has soared since 1981 but still remains relatively small at about 12% of the sample countries by 2007. It seems to us that the trend toward flat taxes is likely to continue for the next several years. Whether or not this second trend continues, exceptional long term changes have already transformed the tax systems of the world.
We also analyzed the relationship between PIT rates and PIT revenue collection and find that the relationship varies in important ways across countries. In particular, we find a statistically significant positive association between tax rates and PIT collection in high income countries. Developing countries, on the other hand, show very weak relationship between tax rates and the PIT/GDP ratio. Our results imply that the size of the informal sector may have contributed to the observed weak relationship between the PIT revenue and the tax rate in developing countries.
The observed trends raise a number of questions that we briefly addressed in the current paper and hope to address more carefully in future work. equity as more of the tax burden is redistributed from the wealthier taxpayers to the lower and middle income classes. The effect of these changes on growth is also of grave importance. To the extent that efficiency has increased, we might expect a positive effect on growth. If inequality also increased, however, then the effect on growth may be ambiguous. That is, increased inequality arising from the tax reform may or may not lead to increased growth (Milanovic, 2000 , Persson and Tabellini, 1994 , and Perotti, 1992 . As such, the net effect on equity, efficiency, and growth remains an empirical question. Notes: Reported are the estimated slopes from regressing marginal and average PIT rates on the trend variable; y is a country's GDP per capita. In Panel A, the estimates are weighted by GDP in constant 1990 U.S. dollars. In Panel B, the estimates are obtained with country fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-robust standard errors; ** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level. Number of observations is in square brackets, and it is the same in all panels. Notes: MRP1 and ARP1 are marginal and average tax rate progressions up to an income level equivalent to four times y, where y is a country's GDP per capita; MRP2 and ARP2 are marginal and average tax rate progressions for the levels of income between y and 3⋅y. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of progressivity measures in Panel A are weighted by GDP in constant 1990 U.S. dollars. Panels B and C report estimated slopes from regressing progressivity measures on the trend variable. In Panel B, the estimates are weighted by GDP in constant 1990 U.S. dollars. In Panel C, the estimates are obtained with country fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-robust standard errors (reported in parentheses); ** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level. Notes: Panel A reports unweighted, unconditional means with standard deviations in parentheses. Omitted categories are countries with no basic allowances or tax credits and no local taxes. Panel B reports the results of the probit regression of each complexity indicator on the trend variable and country categories, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level. The omitted category is high income countries. Panel C reports the fixed effect linear probability regression of each complexity indicator on the trend variable, with countryclustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations is the same in all panels. Table reports the results of unweighted regression of personal income tax revenue as percent of GDP on the time trend, country type, and their interaction, controlling for the reporting revenue base (cash or accrual). The omitted category is high income countries. FE = estimator with country fixed effects. PIT = personal income tax. Country-clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Notes: Panel A reports the results of unweighted regression of PIT revenue as percent of GDP on various tax measures (shown in column titles), the time trend, the reporting revenue base (cash or accrual), and country fixed effects. Panels B through D also control for the log of one-year lagged GDP per capita, a 3-year moving average inflation rate, a 3-year moving average growth rate, a lagged budget deficit indicator, lagged government expenditures as percent of GDP, and the difference between personal and corporate income tax rates. Dummies for each country category are also included in Panel C, but not shown here. The full specification of column 1 in Panel C is reported in Table A4 of the data appendix. The omitted category in Panel C is high income countries. MTR = marginal PIT rate; ATR = average PIT rate; MRP1 and ARP1 are marginal and average tax rate progressions up to an income level equivalent to four times y, where y is a country's GDP per capita. The number of observations is the same in Panels A through C. Corruption index is taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), but it is rescaled from 1 to 6, where 6 indicate worse corruption. Country-clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
